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Abstract
We consider the following fundamental question on ε-differential privacy. Consider an arbi-
trary ε-differentially private algorithm defined on a subset of the input space. Is it possible to
extend it to an ε′-differentially private algorithm on the whole input space for some ε′ compa-
rable with ε? In this note we answer affirmatively this question for ε′ = 2ε. Our result applies
to every input metric space and space of possible outputs. This result originally appeared in a
recent paper by the authors [2]. We present a self-contained version in this note, in the hopes
that it will be broadly useful.
1 Introduction
We are undoubtedly living in a revolutionary era for data science. The number and magnitude
of the available datasets have been growning enormously during the last years. Arguably, though,
what makes the data so useful is also what makes them very sensitive. In order to get a theoretical
handle on the extent to which an algorithm reveals too much about an individual’s data, Dwork
et al. [6] introduced differential privacy, a mathematical property of statistical algorithms which
guarantees privacy of individuals’ input data. Roughly speaking, differential privacy requires that
a change to one individual’s input data not affect the algorithm’s output distribution too much.
Differential privacy appears in the literature in various forms. It is typically presented in its
“relaxed form” with respect to two parameters ε > 0 and δ ≥ 0, [6]. In this note, we focus solely
on the special case δ = 0, sometimes called “pure” differential privacy, or just ε-differential privacy.
Differential privacy is a property of a randomised algorithm which takes values on some metric
space (M, d) and outputs distributions on some measurable space (Ω,F):
Definition 1.1. A randomized algorithm A is ε-differential private if for all subsets S ∈ F of the
output measurable space (Ω,F) and data-sets D1,D2 of the input metric space (M, d),
P (A(D1) ∈ S) ≤ exp [εd(D1,D2)]P (A(D2) ∈ S) . (1.1)
The parameter ε > 0 should be treated as a privacy measure; the smaller the ε the higher the
privacy guarantee.
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An intriguing characteristic of analyzing the performance of an ε-differential private algorithms
is an inherent trade-off between accuracy and privacy. This is simply the property that increasing
the required privacy level of the algorithm (decreasing ε > 0) constrains the accuracy levels of
estimation. The natural quantitiative questions rises: how much accuracy is necessarily sacrificed
if we entitle our algorithms to a minimum level of privacy? To make the question more precise,
suppose that we face an arbitrary statistical estimation question and we restrict ourselves to the
use of algorithms of a certain differential privacy level ε. What is the optimal accuracy that can be
achieved? How does it compare to the optimal accuracy achieved without any privacy guarantee?
Despite the simplicity of this question, in most examples the exact calculation of the underlying
rates of estimation remain, to the best of our knowledge, largely open.
A key feature of any estimation question is the generating data distribution. Notably, this
distribution does not affect at all the ε-differential privacy constraint, as (1.1) should hold for any
pair of input datasets. On the other hand, the assumed generating distribution can massively change
the accuracy guarantee. For example, let us consider the following problem, studied in [7, 3, 1]; the
analyst receives a sampled graphs G from a distribution over bounded degree undirected graphs on
n vertices. The goal is to estimate, in the mean squared error sense, the edge density of the input
graph using an ε-differentially private algorithm. As we mentioned above, the algorithm needs to
satisfy (1.1) for all pairs of graphs, but it needs to be accurate only on graphs appearing with
non-negligible probability as input. In particular, our algorithms suffices to accurately estimate
the edge density solely for bounded degree graphs, while for the rest graphs it could potentially be
extremely inaccurate. If one knows more about how the graph was generated, then one can further
restrict the “interesting” set of inputs—for example, a graph generated from G(n, p) will have cut
density approximately p for all cuts, with high probability (for p not too close to zero).
Building on this inherent feature of the problem the following strategy for designing differentially
private algorithms has appeared in various forms.
• First design an algorithm A1 that is both accurate and ε-differentially private on a setH ⊂M
of “typical” elements of the generating data distribution.
• Extend the algorithm A1 to a private algorithm A2 on the whole space of inputs M so that
(a) it is ε′-differentially private on the whole space for some ε′ ≥ ε and (b) when the input
belongs in H, it outputs the same distribution as the original algorithm A1.
Various such extension results has appeared in the literature [7, 1, 9, 5, 4] but they are usually
tailored for the specific applications each paper discusses. Here, we give a simple proof that such
an extension is always possible for ε′ = 2ε.
Differential privacy, as defined in Definition 1.1, can be easily shown to be equivalent with the
existence of an ε-Lipschitz map from the space of input data (M, d) to the space of probability
measures of some sample space (Ω,F) endowed with the ∞-Renyi divergence metric, D∞(µ, ν) =
log supS∈F |
µ(S)
ν(S) |. Indeed, the condition (1.1) applied to two datasets D1,D2 is equivalent with the
condition D∞(A(D1),A(D2)) ≤ εd(D1,D2).
Viewed from this perspective, the extension of an ε-differentially private mechanism reduces to a
Lipschitz extension question, where a function is assumed to be Lipschitz on a subset of the domain,
and the goal is to be extented to a Lipschitz function on the whole domain. The extendability of
Lipschitz functions has been thoroughly studied in the field of functional analysis, see for example
the Lecture Notes [8]. One standard result in this line of research, states that if the image space
is an ℓ∞(Γ) space for some set Γ, such an extension is always possible with ε
′ = ε (see Theorem
2
2.1 in [8]). Unfortunately the image of differentiable private algorithms does not have the exact
structure of an ℓ∞ space. Despite that, using similar ideas with one of the standard proofs with
the ℓ∞ result, we are able to establish the general extension result for ε
′ = 2ε.
2 The Extension Result
We consider the following statistical model.
The Model
Let n ∈ N and ε > 0. We assume that the analyst’s objective is to estimate a certain quantity
which belongs in some measurable space (Ω,F) from input data which takes values in a metric
space (M, d). The analyst is assumed to use for this task a randomized algorithm A which should
be
(1) as highly accurate as possible for input data belonging in some hypothesis set H ⊆M;
(2) ε-differentially private for arbitrary pairs of input data-sets from (M, d).
Extending Private Algorithms
We now state formally the result described in the note. Consider an arbitrary ε-differentially
private algorithm defined on input belonging in some set H ⊂M. We show that it can be always
extended to a 2ε-differentially private algorithm defined for arbitrary input data from M with
the property that if the input data belongs in H, the distribution of output values is the same with
the original algorithm. We state formally the result.
Proposition 2.1 (“Extending Private Algorithms at ε-cost”). Let Aˆ be an ε-differentially private
algorithm designed for input from H ⊆ M. Then there exists a randomized algorithm A defined
on the whole input space M which is 2ε-differentially private and satisfies that for every D ∈ H,
A(D)
d
= Aˆ(D).
3 Applications
In this section, we describe two applications of Theorem 2.1.
Bounded Degree Graphs
Let D,n ∈ N with D ≤ n. The authors in [7] discuss the following model. Say that an analyst
observes a network and wants to build a private algorithm for estimating a graph quantity of the
network (e.g. the number of triangles, the degree histogram or the number of edges). Differential
privacy here is defined with respect to the node or rewiring distance; the exact definition of this
distance is not in the scope of the note but we encourage the interested reader to the discussion
in Section 2.1. of [7], or Section 1 in [2]. Now motivated by the apparent sparsity of various
real life networks, the authors in [7] face the following question; consider an algorithm which is
ε-differentially private over the space of undirected graphs on n vertices with maximum degree
at most D, which contains all “realistic” graphs for relatively small values of D. Can we extend
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this algorithm to a differentially private algorithm on the whole space of undirected graphs on n
vertices?
Using an efficient approach which is tailored for bounded degree graphs, they establish the
existence of an extension algorithm which is (2ε, δ)-differentially private for some δ ≥ 0 (Lemma
6.2 in [7]).
Notice, though, that the question falls exactly into the setting of our note. In particular, for
M the space of undirected graphs on n vertices endowed with the node distance and H the set of
graphs with bounded degree D, Theorem 2.1 implies the existence of an 2ε = (2ε, 0)-differentially
private extension. Therefore, we conclude the existential aspect of Lemma 6.2. in [7] as a special
case of our result, where we improve the δ to be equal to 0. It is important, though, to notice that
unlike the results in [7], our result does not have any efficiency guarantee.
Estimating Random Graphs
Theorem 2.1 firstly appeared in [2], where the authors discuss the following fundamental and to
the best of our knowledge unexplored question: suppose we receive a sample from a G(n, p) Erdos
Renyi random graph model, where n is known and p is unknown. How well can we estimate p,
in the mean squared error sense, using an ε-differentially private algorithm? Note that differential
privacy is again understood here with the respect to the node distance. The standard approach
for such a question is to add appropriate Laplace noise to the edge density of the observed graph.
In [2] it is established that all such estimators can imply at best a rate of the order
1
n2
+
1
n2ε2
.
However, it turns out that this rate is suboptimal. The main reason is that for any level of Laplace
noise, the estimator can not take into account the “typical” homogeneous structure of an Erdos
Renyi graph. In our paper [2] we take advantage of this property and construct a set H which
captures a typical homogeneous structure of an Erdos Renyi graph. We first build an algorithm on
graphs belonging in H, apply Theorem 2.1 to extend the algorithm and finally obtain a rate
1
n2
+
log n
n3ε2
.
The authors in [2] provide also a tight lower bound result (Theorem 4.5. in [2]) in the similar case
where the graph is sampled from the uniform model G(n,m) and ε is constant with respect to n.
The lower bound result proves that the rate obtained using Theorem 2.1 is optimal for the G(n,m)
case and suggests the same for G(n, p).
4 Proof of Theorem 2.1
We start with a lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let µ be a probability measure on Ω and A′ be a randomized algorithm designed for
input from H′ ⊆M. Suppose that for any D ∈ H′, A′(D) is absolutely continuous to µ and let fD
the Radon-Nikodym derivative dA
′(D)
dµ
. Then the following are equivalent
(1) A′ is ε-differentially private;
(2) For any D,D′ ∈ H
fA′(D) ≤ exp
(
εd(D,D′)
)
fA′(D′), (4.1)
µ-almost surely.
Proof. For the one direction, suppose A′ satisfies (4.1). Then for any set S ∈ F we obtain
P
(
A′(D) ∈ S
)
=
∫
S
fA′(D)dµ
≤ exp
(
εd(D,D′)
) ∫
S
fA′(D′)dµ
= exp
(
εd(D,D′)
)
P
(
A′(D) ∈ S
)
.
We prove the other direction by contradiction. Consider the set
S = {fA′(D) > exp
(
εd(D,D′)
)
fA′(D′)} ∈ F
and assume that µ(S) > 0. By definition on being strictly positive on a set of positive measure
∫
S
[
fA′(D) − exp
(
εd(D,D′)
)
fA′(D′)
]
dµ > 0
or equivalently ∫
S
fA′(D)dµ > exp
(
εd(D,D′)
) ∫
S
fA′(D′)dµ. (4.2)
On the other hand using ε-differential privacy we obtain
∫
S
fA′(D)dµ = P(A
′(D) ∈ S)
≤ exp
(
εd(D,D′)
)
P(A′(D′) ∈ S)
= exp
(
εd(D,D′)
) ∫
S
fA′(D′)dµ,
a contradiction with (4.2). This completes the proof of the Lemma.
Now we establish Theorem 2.1.
Proof. Since H 6= ∅, let D0 ∈ H and denote by µ the measure Aˆ(D0). From the definition of
differential privacy we know for all D ∈ H and S ∈ F , if P
(
Aˆ(D0) ∈ S
)
= 0 then P
(
Aˆ(D) ∈ S
)
=
0. In the language of measure theory that means the measure Aˆ(D) is absolutely continuous to
A(D0). By Radon-Nikodym theorem we conclude that there are measurable functions fD : Ω →
[0,+∞) such that for all S ∈ F ,
P
(
Aˆ(D) ∈ S
)
=
∫
S
fDdµ. (4.3)
We define now the following randomized algorithm A. For every D ∈ M, A(D) samples from
Ω according to the absolutely continuous to µ distribution with density proportional to
inf
D′∈H
[
exp
(
εd(D,D′)
)
fAˆ(D′)
]
.
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That is for every ω ∈ Ω its density with respect to µ is defined as
fA(D)(ω) =
1
ZD
inf
D′∈H
[
exp
(
εd(D,D′)
)
fAˆ(D′)(ω)
]
,
where
ZD :=
∫
Ω
inf
D′∈H
[(
εd(D,D′)
)
f
Aˆ(D)′
]
dµ.
In particular for all S ∈ F it holds
P(A(D) ∈ S) =
∫
S
fA(D)dµ.
We first prove that A is 2ε-differentially private over all pairs of input from M. Using Lemma
4.1 it suffices to prove that for any D1,D2 ∈ H,
fA(D1) ≤ exp (2εd(D1,D2)) fA(D2),
µ-almost surely. We establish it in particular for every ω ∈ Ω. Let D1,D2 ∈ M. Using triangle
inequality we obtain for every ω ∈ Ω,
inf
D′∈H
[
exp
(
εd(D1,D
′)
)
f
Aˆ(D′)(ω)
]
≤ inf
D′∈H
[
exp
(
ε
[
d(D1,D2) + d(D2,D
′)
])
f
Aˆ(D′)(ω)
]
= exp (εd(D1,D2)) inf
D′∈H
[
exp
(
εd(D,D′)
)
f
Aˆ(D′)(ω)
]
,
which implies that for any D1,D2 ∈M,
ZD1 =
∫
Ω
inf
D′∈H
[
exp
(
εd(D1,D
′)
)
fAˆ(D′)
]
dµ
≤ exp (εd(D1,D2))
∫
Ω
inf
D′∈H
[
exp
(
εd(D2,D
′)
)
f
Aˆ(D′)(ω)
]
dµ
= exp (εd(D1,D2))ZD2 .
Therefore using the above two inequalities we obtain that for any D1,D2 ∈ H and ω ∈ Ω,
fA(D1)(ω) =
1
ZD1
inf
D′∈H
[
exp
(
εd(D1,D
′)
)
f
Aˆ(D′)(ω)
]
≤
1
exp (−εd(D2,D1))ZD2
exp (εd(D1,D2)) inf
D′∈H
[
exp
(
εd(D2,D
′)
)
f
Aˆ(D′)(ω)
]
= exp (2εd(D1,D2))
1
ZD2
inf
D′∈H
[
exp
(
εd(D2,D
′)
)
f
Aˆ(D′)(ω)
]
= exp (2εd(D1,D2)) fA(D2)(ω),
as we wanted.
Now we prove that for every D ∈ H, A(D)
d
= Aˆ(D). Consider an arbitrary D ∈ H. From
Lemma 4.1 we obtain that Aˆ is ε-differentially private which implies that for any D,D′ ∈ H
fAˆ(D) ≤ exp
(
εd(D,D′)
)
fAˆ(D′), (4.4)
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µ-almost surely. Observing that the above inequality holds as µ-almost sure equality if D′ = D we
obtain that for any D ∈ H it holds
f
Aˆ(D)(x) = infD′∈H
[
exp
(
εd(D,D′)
)
f
Aˆ(D′)(x)
]
,
µ-almost surely. Using that f
Aˆ(D) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dAˆ(D)
dµ
we conclude
ZD :=
∫
Ω
fAˆ(D)dµ = µ(Ω) = 1.
Therefore
fAˆ(D) =
1
ZD
inf
D′∈H
[
exp
(
εd(D,D′)
)
fAˆ(D′)
]
,
µ-almost surely and hence
f
Aˆ(D) = fA(D),
µ-almost surely. This suffices to conclude that Aˆ(D)
d
= A(D) as needed.
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is complete.
5 An Open Problem: Efficiency
Theorem 2.1 answers affirmatively the question of extendability of an arbitrary ε-differential private
algorithm. An important and interesting open problem for future work is the underlying compu-
tational question; under which conditions such an extension can become computationally efficient?
This was the focus of much of the existing work [7, 1, 9, 5, 4]; our general result suggests that much
greater generality is possible for polynomial-time extensions.
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